Europe’s Gas Dependence: How New Pipelines and LNG Terminals Will Reshape the Energy Landscape in 2026

Gas dependence remains one of the key vulnerabilities of Europe’s energy system, even after the sharp reduction in supplies from traditional sources in 2022–2024. While import volumes have formally changed, the role of natural gas in the EU economy—across industry, power generation, and energy system balancing—has not diminished.

The current stabilization is not the result of abandoning gas, but of restructuring infrastructure: expanding LNG terminals, changing pipeline supply routes, and increasing import flexibility. These processes will largely determine what Europe’s gas map will look like in 2026.

Europe’s Starting Position After 2022–2024

The period from 2022 to 2024 marked a phase of emergency adaptation for the European gas market. Reduced pipeline supplies forced the EU to rapidly reorient imports, increasing the share of LNG and using underground gas storage as a key stabilization tool.

Gas imports into Europe became more diversified by country of origin, but at the same time lost price predictability. The shift from long-term pipeline contracts toward a greater share of spot purchases increased dependence on global market conditions and seasonal fluctuations.

LNG evolved from a supplementary element of the energy balance into the primary instrument for balancing supply and demand. This increased supply flexibility but also made the European market more sensitive to competition with other regions, particularly Asia.

Underground gas storage facilities began to play a distinct role. Storage fill levels became a key indicator of market stability, directly affecting both price dynamics and the system’s ability to pass peak demand periods without crisis measures.

At the same time, gas consumption declined unevenly. The household sector adapted more quickly through energy savings and alternative heating sources, while energy-intensive industry remained vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions. This reinforced gas’s status as a strategic resource.

As a result, by 2025 Europe entered a gas market that appears more stable in the short term, but remains dependent on global market conditions, infrastructure constraints, and seasonal fluctuations.

LNG Infrastructure: Expanded Capabilities and Structural Limits

The sharp increase in LNG’s role became Europe’s key response to changes in gas import structure. Between 2023 and 2025, a number of LNG terminals—particularly floating storage and regasification units—were commissioned or expanded, enabling a rapid increase in import capacity without multi-year construction projects. Overall LNG import capacity in the EU increased by more than 70 bcm in 2023–2024 due to new and expanded terminals, with an additional ~60 bcm expected by 2030.

This gave the European market greater flexibility in choosing suppliers and reduced dependence on specific pipeline routes. Gas became less rigidly tied to geography, and the ability to quickly redirect imports became an important element of energy security. LNG imports increased by 30% in 2025 compared to the previous year, with the United States becoming the dominant supplier.

At the same time, LNG has structural limitations. Its cost is largely determined on the global market, where Europe competes with other regions for the same volumes. During periods of high demand, this creates price pressure regardless of domestic consumption levels. In addition, the capacity of LNG terminals and internal gas transmission networks within the EU remains uneven, creating regional bottlenecks and disparities in access to capacity across countries.

Thus, LNG infrastructure has increased supply flexibility but has not eliminated price risks or dependence on external market conditions. In the medium term, it functions more as a stabilization mechanism than as a full replacement for traditional gas flows.

New Pipelines and Shifting Supply Geography

Alongside LNG development, Europe continues to maintain and modernize its pipeline supply component. This does not represent a return to the previous dependency model, but rather a change in directions and roles of individual routes within the overall system.

At the center of this transformation is the strengthening of southern and western corridors. Supplies from Norway, North Africa, and via the Southern Gas Corridor are gaining importance, as are internal interconnections that allow gas to be redistributed between EU regions. Pipelines increasingly serve an internal logistics function, complementing LNG imports rather than competing with them.

At the same time, pipeline supplies remain less flexible than LNG. They require long-term agreements, stable volumes, and political predictability from both suppliers and transit countries. This limits the ability to respond quickly to demand changes, but provides relatively lower transportation costs under stable conditions.

As a result, pipelines do not disappear from Europe’s energy map in the new configuration, but their role changes. They become a source of base supply and internal balancing, while LNG takes on the role of a flexible supplement during peak demand periods or supply disruptions.

Europe’s Gas Balance in 2026

By 2026, Europe’s gas market is shaped as a combination of two complementary elements: LNG imports and pipeline supplies from diversified sources. Neither instrument is self-sufficient—the stability of the system depends on their simultaneous availability and coordinated infrastructure operation.

LNG provides flexibility and the ability to respond quickly to demand fluctuations, particularly during peak periods or when individual routes are disrupted. However, its role is constrained by high sensitivity to global prices and competition for volumes on the world market. This makes LNG an effective balancing tool, but not a foundation for long-term price stability.

Pipeline supplies, by contrast, remain the basis of predictable volumes under stable conditions. They offer lower transportation costs and play a key role in meeting industrial demand. Their effectiveness, however, depends directly on geopolitical stability and the technical readiness of transit infrastructure.

Conclusions

As of 2026, Europe remains dependent on natural gas, but the model of this dependence has changed significantly. What now matters most is not the origin of the gas, but the ability to physically deliver it—the availability of terminals, pipeline capacity, and the capability of internal networks to redistribute resources between regions.

The combination of LNG imports and pipeline supplies reduces the risk of supply disruptions, but does not ensure stable prices or eliminate exposure to external markets. Under these conditions, gas increasingly serves as an intermediate resource, while the main task of European energy policy becomes not abandoning gas, but reducing the system’s vulnerability to fluctuations in demand, supply, and logistical constraints.