In 2025, energy finally ceased to be just an economic category — it has become the main instrument of global politics. After several years of wars, sanctions, and an accelerated “green transition,” the world has entered a new phase of energy geopolitics, where the boundaries between allies and competitors are often blurred.
Europe is trying to maintain a balance between decarbonization and energy security. The United States uses oil and liquefied natural gas as the “energy weapon of democracies.” China is building its own supply chains in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the Middle East — especially the United Arab Emirates — is showing that even traditional oil exporters can transform into global leaders of the “green” transition.
The global energy sector is no longer divided into “clean” and “dirty.” Its real divide lies between systems that shape political influence and those that merely react to it. In 2025, it is the choice of partners and areas of cooperation that increasingly determines the economic weight of states and regions.
When the “Green Dream” Meets Energy Shortage: How the EU Seeks Balance
The European Union entered 2025 with the largest energy restructuring in the continent’s history. In 2023, the EU produced only about 42% of the energy it consumed, while 58% depended on imports. The rejection of Russian energy resources — initially introduced as a forced step after 2022 — gradually turned into a long-term energy security policy. But in practice, “independence” does not mean self-sufficiency; rather, it reflects a change in the geography of dependencies.
Norway, Qatar, and the United States have become key gas suppliers to the EU, mainly in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). According to the International Energy Agency, LNG imports to Europe increased by roughly 20 billion m³ in the first half of 2025 — a 25% rise compared to the same period the previous year. New terminals in Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands created alternative infrastructure, but also triggered new debates: how “green” can an energy system be when it relies on shipping fossil fuels across the ocean?
Decarbonization is progressing unevenly. France is expanding nuclear energy as its main zero-carbon source. Germany, despite abandoning nuclear plants, faces a shortage of stable capacity and rising electricity imports. Poland still relies on coal but is preparing to launch its first modular nuclear reactor in partnership with the United States.
The challenge of a joint policy lies in the different speeds of transition. For some states, the "green course" is a political necessity and a response to climate risks; for others, it threatens industrial competitiveness. The divide between northern and southern Europe, between old and new EU members, between energy producers and importers is widening.
As a result, a dual reality is emerging: Brussels’ official rhetoric remains climate-focused, while the actual energy policies of member states are becoming increasingly pragmatic. In the new geopolitics of 2025, the winners are not those who decarbonize the fastest, but those who retain control over supply sources and generation technologies.
The United States: Energy as a New Instrument of Influence
In 2025, the United States fully consolidated its status as an energy superpower. A country that two decades ago depended on Middle Eastern oil now sets the rules for the global LNG market and is rapidly gaining weight in “green” energy technologies.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, energy became not just an economic sector but an essential component of U.S. foreign policy. LNG export terminals in Texas and Louisiana are operating at full capacity: according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2024 the U.S. exported about 11.9 billion cubic feet per day of LNG — the largest figure in the world.
The key transformation is that energy exports are tied to industrial policy. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) became the largest package of state support for “green” industry in U.S. history. Hundreds of billions of dollars were directed into battery, solar panel, electric vehicle, and biofuel production, bringing parts of the supply chain back to America.
Europe sees this not only as a “green revolution” but also as economic protectionism: capital and technology flow back across the Atlantic. But for the United States, this is a long-cycle strategy — to make energy independence a pillar of geopolitical power.
Today, Washington influences international decisions not only through sanctions or diplomacy, but through energy flows: support for allies, leverage against opponents. The metaphor “the energy weapon of democracies” took on concrete meaning in 2025.
China and the Global South: The New Geography of Energy
While the West debates the boundaries of the “green transition,” China has been quietly and systematically building its own architecture of energy security. In 2025, Beijing is no longer just a major consumer — it is the center of gravity for new energy alliances within BRICS+ and the Belt and Road Initiative.
China’s model differs from the Western one in two key ways. First, it does not draw a strict line between “traditional” and “green” energy: Beijing invests simultaneously in coal plants, solar farms, nuclear reactors, and LNG infrastructure. Second, China seeks control over supply chains, not just its own production.
Through large-scale investments in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, China secured access to lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth metals — essential for “green” manufacturing. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese state companies control over 80% of cobalt extraction. In the first half of 2025, Chinese Belt and Road energy projects reached roughly USD 42 billion — double the value of the same period in 2024.
Within this approach, BRICS+ is gradually transforming into an energy “club”: Saudi Arabia and Iran supply oil, Brazil provides biofuels, Russia offers gas and nuclear-cycle technologies, while China contributes financing, technology, and markets. Not a classic military-political bloc — but one shaping the new rules of the global energy game.
India acts as a balancing player: accepting Chinese investments but avoiding full dependence while building its own industrial and renewable capacity.
In 2025, China sets the pace. Its influence rests not on hard power, but on technological presence and resource constraints — from electric vehicles to solar panels deployed across dozens of countries. New dependencies now have not an oil nature, but a silicon or lithium one.
The Middle East and the New Role of the UAE: From Oil Exporters to Exporters of the Future
The United Arab Emirates have become the main exception in a region long associated exclusively with oil. In 2025, they demonstrate that even traditional energy can become the foundation of technological and climate modernization.
The UAE Net Zero 2050 strategy and Vision 2030 are reshaping the country’s economic model: instead of simple raw-material exports, the Emirates invest in hydrogen clusters, solar energy, desalination, and eco-architecture. For example, official platforms state that by 2030 the country plans to invest AED 150–200 billion (USD 40–55 billion) in renewable energy sources.
Masdar City — once a futuristic desert concept — now serves as a real testbed for sustainable technologies: from low-energy materials to autonomous public transport.
The UAE uses its oil legacy as start-up capital for entering a new era. Oil revenues are funneled into global “green” investments: on the eve of COP28, reports showed Emirati state companies linked to nearly USD 200 billion in investments, mostly in clean energy. This makes the country one of the most influential investors in low-emission technologies.
Unlike many Western models, where ecological transformation triggers social or political tensions, in the Emirates it enjoys unified state support. Energy strategy is not seen as a compromise between economy and climate, but as an instrument of global status. This is why the UAE became the venue for global negotiations: for the first time, COP28 resolutions referenced a phased transition away from fossil fuels — “the beginning of the end of the fossil era.”
At the same time, the country does not renounce its energy identity. It does not “atone” for oil — it reinterprets it as a resource for development, education, and influence. This approach is key to Middle Eastern stability: wealth is not simply burned but reinvested into the future.
The UAE is an example of how a state can remain part of the oil world while setting standards of “green” leadership. This synthesis makes it not just an energy player but an architect of a new era of resource development.
Africa and the Future of Energy: The New Front of Global Alliances
In 2025, Africa has become what the Middle East was in the mid-20th century: a continent of enormous energy potential and simultaneous risks of new dependencies. Interests of China, Europe, the U.S., and Arab monarchies intersect here — each sees Africa not only as a source of resources but as political leverage.
For Europe, Africa is key to the green energy of the future. Countries like Morocco, Egypt, Namibia, and Mauritania are developing massive solar and wind farms aimed at exporting green hydrogen. Research shows that Africa has vast renewable-energy potential: low solar and wind costs position it well to win the hydrogen race. The EU invests in these projects, seeking supply chains that reduce dependence on the Middle East and Asia. Yet behind this lies a familiar risk — a new form of energy neo-colonialism: technologies belong to the West, profits to multinational corporations, while local communities receive minimal benefits.
China operates differently: loans, roads, ports, factories — in exchange for resource access. Its projects are less flashy but strategically calculated: control over lithium, cobalt, manganese, and uranium deposits creates long-term technological advantage.
Arab investors are increasingly active as well: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar finance energy infrastructure in East Africa, combining their capital with European technologies. This forms a new triangle of cooperation — “EU–Middle East–Africa” — with the potential to shape the world’s energy map for decades.
The problem is that behind these major projects, Africa still lacks its own decisive voice. Without mechanisms of control, its energy future may become not a story of development but a repetition of the past — where resources serve external interests.
Yet Africa has a chance not to be a supplier of raw materials but a center of a new energy system. Its natural potential — sun, wind, hydropower, biomass — makes the continent one of the most promising platforms for transitioning from exporting resources to exporting energy. Here it will be determined whether the 21st century becomes the century of true “green equality” or yet another era of redistributed influence.
Conclusion
The global energy sector in 2025 is a complex system of new connections and old contradictions. Moving away from fossil fuels has not made states independent — it has merely changed the nature of their interdependencies.
Europe is learning to live without Russian gas but now depends on LNG, critical minerals, and technologies. The U.S. uses its resources and “green” subsidies to maintain industrial advantage and influence allies. China, meanwhile, builds networks of economic and technological ties through investments across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Against this backdrop, the UAE exemplify how a country can transform oil capital into a development tool. Their experience shows that modernization is possible without destroying traditional energy — if investments in technology and education are made at the right time.
Africa, for its part, is becoming the main testing ground for the future. Here the world will decide whether it can shift to “green” energy without repeating colonial patterns of uneven resource distribution.
In the new geopolitical reality, it matters less who owns the resources and more who knows how to manage them — rationally, strategically, and with a long-term vision.
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